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A Exploration of the Research Literature on, and Discussion of the Possible
Interaction Between, Religiosity, Values, and Adolescent Development.

by
Paul F. Russell BTheo!MelbCoi/Div, BEdNDA, BA(J'sych)EdithCowan

Faculty of Community Studies, Education and Social Sciences,
Edith Cowan University, Joondalup.
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Abstract

The current work examined the areas of religiosity, values and adolescent
development. The recent literature with regard to the nature of religiosity as a
measure of an individual'' commitment to a particular religion was explored. The
issues of measurement and definition were outlined, and a position was taken as to
the multi-dimensionality of religiosity. The recent work on values by Schwartz
(1992) was also explored. Values were defined and the theory of a universal set
of values, as well as the relationship of values to each other was outlined, along

with the organisation of those individual values into value types. The relationship
between values and religiosity was explored. The area of adolescent
development, based on the theory of psychosocial development proposed by
Erikson (1968, 1977) was also explored. This understanding of the nature of
adolescent development has suggested that adolescents must explore issues such
as politics and religion as part of that stage of development. It was suggested that
adolescent development, therefore, had a significant possibility of impacting on
the relationship between values and religiosity. This possible impact of
adolescent development on both values and religiosity was suggested.
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Whether or not students adopt an appropriate values system is a significant
concern for any educational institution, but is particularly paramount for a
religious school (Russell, 1997). The religious school is charged with the task of
conveying the dominant culture no less than other schools, but in such a way that
tbe entire curricula is enlivened and permeated with the values of the sponsoring
Church. The effectiveness of the religious school, then, rests not only with exam
results, university entrance or hours spent in religion classes, but rather the real

formation ofthe young people within the school in the model of the sponsoring
Church.
While only 16% of Australians profess having no religion, and the vast
majority of Australians profess memb.,rship of one of the mainstream Christian
churches, the amount of time spent in religious activity by Australians on average
is decreasing (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1997, 1999). It may be suggested
that attendance at worship services is seen as of secondary importance to the
members who will accept the values and moral code of the church, but not the
discipline of regular attendance at church services. Alternatively, it may be the
case that the drop in church attendance is reflective of an alienation both from the
church itself and the moral code and discipline that the church promotes.
The relationship between religiosity as a measure of how religious an
individual is and the values that the individual holds is the focus of a number of
studies. In particular, research by Roccas and Schwartz (1997) and Schwartz and
Huismans (1995) indicate a strong correlation between religiosity and values, but
do not address the strength of this relationship in younger people.
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For those involved in education within a religious context, the correlation
between values and religiosity is an important one, but the impact of adolescent
development on this relationship adds another significant dimension. The area of
adolescent development is one of particular importance in this area of school
effectiveness. It is of paramount importance that all programmes of study, and
indeed the mTangement of all school activity, be designed and modified according
to what is known about the psychology of adolescent development so as to most
effectively achieve the programme's objectives. In the area ofreEgious
development, all programmes of religious education, and all activity which seeks
to inculcate the values of the sponsoring church, must also be designed with
appropriate attention to adolescent development. In this way, the aim of the
effective socialisation of the adolescent may be achieved.
In addition to the research in the three areas of religiosity, values and

adolescent development, consideration must be made ofthe interaction between
each of these. The current work seeks to review the significant literature and
research in the areas of religiosity, values and adolescent development, and further.
seeks to make some theoretical connections between these three areas based on
the previous research. Some suggested avenues for future research and study will
be proposed.
Religiosity
Definition and Measurement Concerns

Any discussion on the impact of religiosity within psychology must first
resolve the linked problems of definition and measurement. Without a clear and
accepted definition of religiosity, an effective measure of the levels of religiosity
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cannot be developed. A cursory glance at the literature on religiosity will
demonstrate that even with a working definition, measuring religiosity is not a
simple task. This is despite the fact that systematic research into the area of the
psychology of religion has been conducted since the later part of the nineteenth
century (Wulff, 1991). Measures of religiosity vary from crude single-item
questions (e.g., Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) to more
complex questionnaires (e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967; Francis & Stubbs, 1987;
Gorsuch, Mylvaganam, Gorsuch, & Johnson, ! 997; Plante & Boccaccini, 1997).
These differences in the measurement of religiosity spring from differences in the
conceptual understanding of the nature of religiosity itself.
In attempting to find a common definition of religiosity, a distinction must
be made between a focus on motivation and on practice. It may be the case that a
simple definition of religiosity is focussed on either church attendance or religious
affiliation. In this way religiosity may be assessed with questions such as "What

religion are you?", "How often do you attend religious services?", or even. '"To
what extent would you describe yourself as religious?". It is only the last of these
which would come close to an attempt at assessing the extent to which an
individual has internalised the religious beliefs and values oftheir religion, but
may also just as easily be interpreted in terms of mere ?ractice. Thus people may
see themselves as more or less religious because of the number oftimes they
attend church services, rather than the extent to which they accept the values of
the Church and pmfess its creed.
Conversely, religiosity may be seen specifically as an attempt to measure
the motivation for an individual's attendance at church services. In this way,
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people are more or less religious on the basis that they attend their church for
'religious' reasons, such as to worship God or to pray, rather than for perceived
social benefit. This definition forms the basis of the intrinsic and extrinsic
religiosity proposed by Allport and Ross (1967) in their investigation into religion
and prejudice, and much replicated in later studies. It is important to note,
however, that in that study the distinction was made between high extrinsic and
high intrinsic motivation, rather than high religiosity on the basis of either
extrinsic or intrinsic responses.
Finally, it may be possible to see religiosity as the measure of acceptance
and knowledge of religious doctrine. Hence, the ability to recite biblical texts or
church doctrine and the level of acceptance of specific doctrine would be seen as a
reflection ofthe level of religiosity. This is at least part of the measure of
religiosity examined by instruments such as the Shepherd Scale (Pecnik &
Epperson, 1985). According to one author, however, while this assessment of
religiosity through creedal asseot forms part of a number of instruments, the
method should be seen as a "serious shortcoming of the majority of existing
scales" (Wulff, 1991, p.215).
The difficulties in the area of the psychology of religion are therefore twofold: the lack of a widely accepted definition of religiosity, and the too common
practice in the research literature of failing to provide an operational definition of
religiosity. A brief discussion on the major avenues of research into the
psychology of religion and religiosity follows.

7

Multi- Versus Uni-Dimension«}
The simplest conception of religiosity is that of a single dimension factor,
aod is usunlly measured by a single-item on a larger questionnaire. Often it
focuses on behaviour, with the measure being that of church attendance. While
there would seem to be some support for this position (Wulff, 1991 ), the greater

amount of research literature argues for a multi-dimensional understanding of
religiosity (see e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967; DeJong. Faulkner, & Warland, 1976;
Donahue, 1985; Francis, Lewis, Philipchalk, Lester, & Brown, 1995; Francis &
Stubbs, 1987; Gorsuch, 1984; Gorsuch, 1988; Gorsuch et al., 1997; Joseph &
Lewis, 1997; Plan« & Boccaccini, 1997; Trimble, 1997). Many studies have
utilised factor analytic methods in an attempt to detennine the number and kind of
the dimensions of religiosity (for a review see DeJong et al., 1976), with the
number of dimensions of religiosity varying from three to ten. Often the
dimensions suggested are similar, giving further credence to the theoretical
position that religiosity is multi-dimensional.
The case for the multi-dimensionality of religiosity begins with the

assertion that, even at its face value "religion seems far too complex an area of
human behaviour - as diverse and heterogeneous as human behaviour - not to
include many different and unrelated types of variables" (Dites, 1969, cited in
DeJong~~

al., 1976, p.889). Cross-cultural studies (DeJong et al., 1976) have

suggested support for the multi-dimensional position. Indeed, at the most basic
level, Allport and Ross (1967) noted that the motivation for attendance at
religious services suggested significant differences in religiosity.

'-'· ·-:;
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The nature of religiosity, however, is often determined by the research. It
is possible to conceptualise religiosity as a single dimension when religiosity is
not the central focus ofth• research. It is clear that it is possible to soparate
people along a single dimension of religious or not-religious (Benda & Corwyo,
1997; Gorsuch, 1984) should that be desirable. Similarly thoug.i, it is possible to
separate religious people into at least two dimensions (Allport & Ross, 1967).

The current work conceptualises religiosity in a multi-dimensional manner.
Religiosity is viewed as a measurement of the extent to which an individual has
internalised the doctrines and practices of the religion.
Extrinsic versus Intrinsic

Throughout the literature, there is considerable reference made to the early
work of Allport and Ross (1967) on religion and prejudice, from which carne the
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity. In many ways this research
can be seen as the progenitor of those current theories based on the multidimensional nature of religiosity. In that research, the authors reviewed numerous
earlier studies all of which noted that on average churchgoers were more
prejudiced than non-churchgoers. This would seem to have been a surprising
result, as the mainstream Churches in the United States during the time of the civil
rights movement were taking an open stand against prejudice, and were losing
both members and financial support because of that stand. On a more theological
level, Allport and Ross (1967) noted that the message of equality and common
humanity which was representative of all great world religions, in addition to the
example of numerous and varied religious leaders, seemed to contradict the
message of prejudice that was being lived at least by some religious people.

"
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In addressing that apparent contradiction, Allport aod Ross (1967) came to
suggest that a distinction could be made between the type of religiosity that was
being demonstrated. That study found that the relationship between church
attendance aod prejudice was cmvilinear. In essence, while seldom attenders
were seen to be more prejudiced than non-religious people, frequent attenders
were less prejudiced than infrequent attenders, aod often less than non-attenders
(Allport & Ross, 1967, p.433). It is beyond the scope of the current study to
review the literature which is focussed on the levels of prejudice. It is importao~
however, to see that a distinction was drawn between formal behaviours, such as

attendance at church services, and involvement or commitment to religious
values. That difference was characterised in the following way:
It seems obvious that the regular attenders who go to church once a week

or oftener are people who receive something of special ideological and
experiential meaning. Irregular; casual fringe members, on the other hand,
regard their religious contacts as less binding, less absorbing, Jess integral
with their personal lives .... Perhaps the briefest way to characterise the
two poles of subjective religion is to say that the extrinsically motivated
person uses his [or her] religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated
person lives his [or her] religion (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.434).
In this way, the extrinsically motivated person would be seen to use their religious

contacts for personal gain, such as for social contact, to provide security and
solace, status or self-justification, where as the intrinsically motivated person
would find in the religious values of their church a "master motive" for Jiving
(Allport & Ross, 1967, p.434).
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While the extrinsic and intrinsic distinction is maintained in more recent

literature, a further clarification is offered. This later research has developed the
concept of extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity, and a number of authors (e.g.,
Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989; Gorsuch, Mylvaganam, & Gorsuch, 1997) have
suggested that extrinsic religiosity can be further defined into two categories:
personally-, and socially- orientated extrinsic motivation. In this way, the
extrinsic motivation for church attendance was separated into those extrinsic items

that were oriented towards personal gain, such as the solace achieved thorough
worship, and the social benefit gained, such as maintaining friendships. The
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, seen as being personally
committed in the way conceptualised by Allport and Ross (1967), remains.
Indeed the later research shows support for the intrinsic conceptualisation, in
addition to that support offered for the two types of extrinsic motivation. While
this clarification is seen by some researchers as being significant enough to
warrant a renewed examination of the extrinsic/intrinsic research (e.g., DeJong et
al., 1976; Gorsuch et al., 1997), it remains that the distinction is inherent in the
Allport and Ross (1967) conceptualisation of religiosity, who defined the
extrinsically religious as those who found religion "useful in a variety of ways"
(p.434). Both those who found solace and those who found social status and
contact were seen to be extrinsic, and it was the distinction between extrinsic and

intrinsic which was seen to be significant. As that study notes, "to know that a
person is in some sense 'religious' is not as important as to know the role religion

plays in the economy of his [or her] life" (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.442). In the
same way it can be conceptualised that knowing which extrinsic motivation is
'••

....
"
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stronger is not as important as knowing whether a person is extrinsically or
intrinsically motivated.
In later research, a further distinction is also made between the current
understanding of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity and the original Allport and
Ross (1967) conceptualisation of those terms. In that earlier research religiosity
was seen as something of o single continuum and individuals were located

somewhere on it at either the extrinsic or the intrinsic end. Further, that research
tended to conceptualise religiosity in an almost categorical manner, suggesting
that people were either intrinsic or extrinsic in their religiosity. Allport and Ross
(1967) found it difficult to see people able to vacillate between the two extremes,
or indeed to locate people in the middle with traits ofboth extrinsic and intrinsic
religiosity, and so these indiscriminately proreligious were effectively excluded
from the category of being religious, or at the very least seen as "obscuring" the
results (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.441).
The current rosearch conceptualises a far greater fluidity in the
motivations. It is both possible for people to have some of each of these three
motivations, and to change the 'level' of their motivation. At any given time,
therefore, an individual may be more or less intrinsically or extrinsically
motivated. This does not necessarily suggest that people change the basic
motivation randomly; it is still possible to conceptualise individuals who are
predominantly extrhsically or intrinsically motivated. It does, however, allow for
the possibility that even the most intrinsically motivated person may also be a
little extrinsically motivated, and that this level of extrinsic motivation may
change slightly from time to time. As one study notes (Gorsuch et al., 1997), it is

',
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the nature of accepting a multidimensional understanding of religiosity that it is
also necessary to accept that one person's motivation may not be identical to
another's, and that each person may be religious for multiple reasons. While the
original research did not conceptualise this level of fluidity, it would seem to be
common in more contemporary studies to accept that a person may participate in a

religious ritual for any number of reasons, both extrinsic and intrinsic.
One further clarification about religiosity must also be made. In the early
work by Allport and Ross {1967) church attendance was assumed and religiosity
was measured was, in the first instance, by the level of church attendance. The
research focus then shifted to an examination of the motivation for church
attendance. In later research the focus moves again, and a significant debate has
been waged on religiosity as either a multi- or a uni-dimensional concept. The
multi-dimensional position is argued on the basis of Allport and Ross' (1967)
original work, and focuses on the motivation for church attendance (e.g., Gorsuch,
Mylvaganam, Gorsuch, & Johnson, 1997). Clearly in this model, people at a
worship service might be there for either intrinsic or extrinsic reasons, and the
primary motivation of one may be of little concern to another. Similarly, an
individual may attend religious service to worship God (intrinsic), receive grace
(extrinsic personal) and enjoy community fellowship (extrinsic social). Indeed,
these three things might well motivate people at the same time, each 'taking turns'
at being the primary motivation.
This confusion about the distinctiveness of religiosity and motivation for
church attendance may have overly complicated the research in this area.
Following the work of Donohue (1985), a distinction is made between attendance

J
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at church services and personal religious con.mitment. In each uf !he major
studies reviewed, attendance at church services has been assumed, and it is the
motivation for attendance which is measured and conceptualised as being either
extrinsic or intrinsic. An effective conceptualisation of religiosity as a
multidimensional concept, however, must be able to incorporate a religiousness

which is not tied to church attendance.
The current work seeks to conceptualise religiosity in a way which moves
beyond mere church attendance because, for example, it is postulated that church
attendance may well be coerced in younger people and will thus fail to reflect any
sense of religious commitment. Conversely, while a strong belief in a deity will
impact on behavior, the experience of the divine and a sense of being a religious
person may well not be connected to attendance at church services, especially for
young people who, it will be argued later, are able to experience being religious
before they are able to commit to a particular religious tradition. Hence,
religiosity is neither mere church attendance nor the reasons for church
attendance. It must be conceptualised as an experience ofbeing a part of a
universe that is created by a deity, to whom it is possible to relate in some way.
Values
The concept of value is central to a number of theories of the nature of the
human person, and thus has a wide range of meanings both within psychological
literature, wider academic literature and in common usage. Possibly the first
significant attempt to explore and define values within a psychological framework
was that conducted byRokeach (1960, 1968, 1975). Here we find an attempt to
.·differentiate between related concepts such as be:ief, attitude, value and value-

',·.·'·
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system. For Rokeach, a value is seen to be akin to a disposition a person may
have. It is similar to an attitude, which in that study is defined as "an organisation
of beliefs ... [and] a set of interrelated predispositions focussed on an attitude
object or situation" (Rokeach, 1975, p.l20), however, a value is more basic than
an attitude, and may underlie the attitude.
A value is also distinct from but related to a belief In its simplest
definition a belief is a proposition which can be preceded by the phrase 'I believe
that ... ' (Rokeach, 1975, p.113). A belief is seen to have three components: a
cognitive component, reflecting what is known about the focus of the belief; an
affective component, reflecting the commitment the person has to the belief, and
the arousal the person will experience if the beliefis challenged; and a
behavioural component, because the belief a person holds will motivate a
patticular behaviour. In this conceptualisation, a value is defmed as:
a type ofbelief, centrally located within one's total belief system, about
how one ought or ought not to behave, or about some end-state of
existence worth or not worth attaining. Values are thus abstract ideals,
positive or negative, not tied to any specific object or situation,
representing a person's beliefs about ideal modes of conduct and ideal
terminal goals (Rokeach, 1975, p.l24).
It is in the nature of the object that is seen as important that Ne find the difference
between a belief and a value: beliefs are specific, while values are a special type
ofbeliefwhich are abstract and focussed on ideals. In this way a person might be
seen to have "tens or hundreds ofthousands of beliefs, thousands of attitudes but
only dozens of values" (Rokeach, 1975, p.l24).

IS

In more recent times, a number of studies have advanced the theory of
values and values research, most notably those of Schwartz and Bilsky (I 987,
1990) and Schwartz (1992). While Rokeach (1960, 1968, 1975) examined the

relationship between values, beliefs and the values system, he made little attempt
to organise values into a coherent structure. This is the focus of the later studies.
The definition of values offered in ihe later studies is drawn from earlier work. In

this way values are seen as consisting of five features, and are defined as
"concepts or beliefs, about desirable end states or behaviours, that transcend

specific situations, guide selection or evaluation ofbehaviour or events, and are
ordered by relative importance' (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, p.SSl).
An immediate similarity may be seen between this definition and the
earlier one offered by Rok.,.ch (1975), in that this definition also contains specific
cognitive and behavioural cor. 1ponents, and infers a level of commitment
suggested by the affective component. The final part ofthis later definition of
value focuses on the manner in which the value fits into a wider value structure,
which is inherent in the earlier Rokeach definition and which finds its expression
as Rokeach describes the concept of the value system. There is one immediate
difference, however, between the two definitions: the distinction between belief
and value made by Rokeach seems to be lost.
It is not in the subtle definitional changes, however, that these later studies

differ from the earlier ones. The advancement is made in the way these later
studies attempt to organise individual values into a typology of value groups,
which are initially called motivational domains, according to the content of the
individual value. This arrangement is done initially on the basis of the theoretical
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position that values are cognitive representations of one of three basic and

universal human requirements: biological needs, social interactional needs, and
social institutional needs (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). As •'· 'riginal theory is
developed, the motivational domaius are relabelled as :n.

Jnal types, the

seven initial domains are extended to eleven, and then reduced to ten, and the
definitions and names of the domains themselves are sharpened (Schwartz, 1992).
The ten domains are listed, along with short definitions, in Table I. The specific
arrangement of values into value types as suggested by Schwartz (1992) is to be
found in as an Appendix.

In addition to the suggestion that individual values may be grouped into
value types, the recent literature (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz &
Huismans, 1995) has also suggested that a relationship between the value types
may be found. Essentially, the achievement of one value type through a range of
action is either compatible or incompatible with the attainment of another value
type. In the example offered by Schwartz ( 1992), actions in support of Obedience
will be likely to conflict with actions in support oflndependence, but be
supportive of those aimed at Social Order. In this new theory of values, an overall
structure is suggested for the various value types, outlining the relationship
between the value types. This structure is represented by Figure I. Values
adjacent to each other are suggested by Schwartz (1992) to have actions
compatible '"ith the attainment of both value types. Greater distance suggests
decreasing compatibility, and those values opposite each other are seen to be in
direct conflict. In this way, actions that would lead to the satisfaction of the
power values are also those that would lead to the satisfaction of achievement or

,·._·;_
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security values, but would be contradictory to the satisfaction ofthe values of
universalism.
Hence, in the recent work Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) and by
Schwartz (1992), values are seen to be motivational, related to evaluation about
the worth or otherwise of various beliefs or events, abstract and universal.
Further, individual values can be seen to be related to other individual values, and
may be grouped into similar motivational value types. Finally, these value types
may be seen to be more or less related to each other, in as much as the actions
which either support or contradict the attainment of a given value type may be
seen to be more or less either supportive of, or in conflict with, another value type.
Values and Religiosity
Just as a relationship between the different value types can be observed
and explored, a relationship between specific behaviour and the various value
types can also be hypothesised. In this way, a relationship between religious
behaviour and the various value types can also be examined. The strength of the
value for religion and associated behaviour cannot be underestimated. In
Schwartz (1992), spirituality is added as a possible eleventh domain, and then
rejected because of insufficient empirical support. While the data did not suggest
this to be the case, the theory behind the support of spirituality is sound and
should be briefly explored. In proposing the eleven motivational value types to be
explored, Schwartz (1992) suggested that the search for meaning is an inherent
force in the human life, and this would be reflected by a value type of spirituality.

In the way that spirituality was defined in that study, its existence as a value type
was not supported. Two reasons are offered as to why this was not the case.

18

Firstly, as Schwartz ( 1992) notes, it may be that people are finding meaning
through other types of values. Specifically:
The pursuit of meaning and coherence as described by theologians and
philosophers may entail a level of sophisticated, effortful thought that is
beyond that in which most people typically engage. Instead, most people
may satisfY their need for coherence through pursuing tradition, security,
and conformity values (Schwartz, I 992, p.1 0).
By defining spirituality as a search for meaning, it may be that the value may not
be robuSt enough to survive on its own. Secondly, it may be that spirituality finds
its expression though a number of different and specific values, rather than
through a distinct value type of its own. Interestingly, this is much more in line
with other work in the area of spirituality, which suggests that this is the case
(e.g., Chandler, Holden, & Kolander, 1992; Westgate, 1996). Regardless of
which of these two are accepted, it is obvious that spiritual concerns are likely to
have a significant impact both on values, and by valuing spirituality, on
behaviour. In later studies Schwartz and Huismans (1995) and Roccas and
Schwartz (1997) examined the hypothesised relationship between values and
religious behaviour, suggesting that a clear relationship between religiosity and
value types may be maintained. This relationship is outlined below.
The original values theory discussed above (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz &
Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990) suggested a relationship between value
types, with behaviour advancing one value type being seen as either supportive of,
or contrary to, the advancement on another votll o type. This same relationship can
be seen to exist in the behaviour exercised in advancement of the value of 'being

·,_,·,·,
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religious', which is suggested forms part of several value types, and is the focus of
the study conducted by Schwartz and Huismans (1995) and Roccas and Schwartz
(1997). In exploring the relationship between religiosity, which is defined simply
in that study as the "degree of commitment to religion" (Schwartz & Huismans,
1995, p.98), a brief examination ofthe theological, sociological and philosophical
aspects of religiosity were compared to the contents of the value types.
This later study suggested that the activity of all religions was the search
for meaning beyond the immediate through belief and worship, and that this was
achieved through the function of religion in encouraging its members to "temper
self-indulgent tendencies and to foster transcendental concerns and beliefs ...
[through] promulgating religious creeds, mmal proscriptions, and ritual
requirements" (Schwartz& Huismans, 1995, p.91). Higher religiosity, measured
in that study by a simple single-item question, was seen to reflect acceptance of
those requirements and proscription& Therefore, a clear relationship between
higher religiosity and various value type could be hypothesised. For example,
high religiosity was seen to be closely related to the value type Traditio!], as it was
that value type t!1at contained values that emphasised acceptance of traditional
rituals and customs, and submission to transcendental ar.thority (Roccas &
Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). The hypothesised relationships
between religiosity and the different value types are listed in Table 2.
The findings of the study conducted by Schwartz and Huismans (1995)
and later replicated (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997) seem to suggest support for the
general theory that a relationship between religious behaviour and value types
exists, and for the most part that the relationship was as predicted by the
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researchers. In all cases where a direction was predicted for the correlation, that
direction was observed, although not always with the predicted strength. The
actual correlations between value types and religiosity is displayed as Table 3.
The researchers also claim that their data suggest that the relationship between
value religiosity is a two-directional one: specifically, being religious both
influences value priorities and is influenced by already developed value priorities.
They summarise their findings in this way:
The overall pattern of consistent religiosity.value correlations suggests
that valuing certainty, self-restraint, and submission to superior external
verities inclines people to become more religious in general; valuing

openness to change and free self-expression inclines people to become Jess
religious (Schwartz & Huismans, I995, p.1 05).
Adolescent Development
While Schwartz and Huismans (1995) outlined a theory which explored
the relationship between values and religiosity, that theory has not been applied to
the adolescent. The relationship between religiosily and values for adolescents
may well reflect the rolationship found in adult samples, however, the impact of
adolescent development may change the shape of that relationship, and so a brief
examination of adolescent development as suggested by Erikson (1968, 1977) is
now offered. The basis of Erikson's theory of development is threefold. Firstly,
it suggests tltat the development of the person and the personality continues
throug!t the life-span. Secondly, this development proceeds through a series of
st&ges, the successful navigation of which is both presuppo•ed by previous stages

ar1d necessary for subsequent ones. Thirdly, each stage is characterised by a
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'crisis', the successful resolution of which is neceosary for the development of the
'virtue' associated with that stage, and for successful progress to the next stage.
The way that each stage builds on the successful resolution of the previous
stages, and the successful resolution of which is necessary for subsequent stages,
is a significant part of the theory of development offered by Erikson (1968, 1977),
and is called the "epigenetic principle" (Erikson, 1968, p92). The theory suggests
that development is properly achieved only when the stages are reached "in the
proper rate and the proper sequence" (Erikson, 1968, p.93). The adolescent stage
is concerned with resolution of concerns about identity. The resolution of identity
issues is not attempted before adolescence, but must be resolved before
subsequent stages can be successfully attempted, although there is some
suggestion that a certain fluidity is possible. I has also been suggested that
gender differences may have a significant impact on development at this time
(Hodgson & Fischer, 1979; Marcia & Friedman, 1970), however, this has not yet
received as wide support as the original theory, and it is beyond the scope of the
current work to include a detailed review of the possible impact of gender. For
Erikson, however, the epigenetic principle remains centraL He describes it in the
following manner:
The principle states that anything that grows has a ground plan, and that
out of this ground plan the parts arise, each part having its time of special
ascendancy, until all parts have arisen to form a func!ioning whole
(Erikson, 1968, p.92).
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Hence, each stage has an over-riding focus specific to that stage alone, but which
is a vital part ofthe whole development of the person and is necessary before the
successful resolution of the subsequent stages may be achieved.
The notion ofthe 'crisis' of each stage has also had significant attention,
· with the 'adolescent crisis' and the 'midlife crisis' receiving common acceptance.
The specific understanding that Erikson (1968, 1977) had aboutthe crisis of each
stage is worthy of clarification. Firstly, the crisis is not specific to these two
times, but is a vital part of each stage. Erikson (1968, 1977) argues that as each
stage has a specific focal point and is part of a predetermined ground plan, this
focal point is brought sharply into focus at the appropriate time. This crisis is not
seen by Erikson (1968, 1977) as a negative, but rather as a "radical change in
perspective" (Erikson, 1968, p. 96). Ochse and Plug (1986) summarize it in this
way:
In each stage conflict arises between newly emerging personal needs and

social demands, and culminates in a crisis. A crisis is a normal event. It
represents a turning point in development, rather than a catastrophe, and
leaves both positive and negative residues that influence the course of
future development (p.l240).
The crisis is seen, therefore, as a normal and necessary way in which the primary
focus of each stage is brought to the attention of the developing person, so that it
might be addressed. It is this understanding of crisis, and attempts to avoid overly
negative overtones, that have !ed some to rename crisis with less loaded terms
such as 'issue' (e.g., Miller, 1993) .
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The successful resolution of the crisis results in the achievement of a
specific virtue. Just as each crisis is characterised as an opportunity for growth
and as a change in perspective, the resolution of each results in the development
of a new function or characteristic. For example, as the adolescent achieves a
sense of personal identity, the virtue of fidelity is also achieved, by which the
adolescent is able to express a commitment to the ideals now part oftbeir identity
and a loyalty to the people now regarded as important. Despite some
clarifications and the fact that the majority of research has focussed on the
adolescent stage (Ochse & Plug, 1986), Erikson's theory is widely accepted and
has been replicated in other cultures and situations (see, e.g., Wang & Viney,
1996; Ochse & Plug, 1986).
For Erikson, the period of adolescence is a particularly critical one, for it is
in this period that the significant crisis of identity is faced. The adolescent
struggles with attempting to define a sense of identity and to avoid identitydiffusion. The concerns for the adolescent are focussed on how they appear to
themselves and to others and their attempts to define who they are and what they
believe. The central preoccupations of the adolescent are therefore their desire to
find someone or something in which to freely believe, their need to freely assent
in areas of duty and service, their development of trusting friendships, and their
choice of occupation, which "assumes a significance beyond the question of
remuneration and status" (Erikson, 1977, p. 129).
As the adolescent struggles with the old accepted beliefs and tries to
refocus on what is important and worthy of acceptance, an impact on the
adolescent's religious activity and expressed values is to be expected. It is a
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necessary part of attempting to achieve resolution of the identity crisis that
adolescents examine, and later make, a commitment to occupational choices,
political beliefs and religious attitudes (Marcia, 1966; Craig-Bray, Adams &
Dobson, 1988; Markstrom-Adams, Hofstra & Dougher, 1994).
It is important to note that the adolescent does not attempt identity
resolution in all facets at once. Marcia (1966) and others (e.g., Coleman, 1978)
have noted that the adolescent is able to focus on individual areas, while putting
others on 'hold'. In particular, Marcia (1966) has suggested that adolescents
move through four areas, depeodiog on the level of mature thought and
commitment. According to Marcia (1966) an adolescent may be categorized into
one of four groups according to the level of commitment and thought: from
foreclosure, where a high degree of commitment is demonstrated although there
has been no attempt at mature thought, through diffusion, with low commitment
and low thought, to moratorium, with a high degree of thought but no
commitment and finally to achievement, with a high degree of both thought and
commitment. In this way, an individual may well have achieved a sense of
identity in the occupational area, be working on the area of politics but not yet
have even considered the area of religion. Indeed, Kroger and Green (1996) note
that a range of events are associated with movement towards achieving identity in

specific areas. In most cases an internal change is closely associated with
achieving a sense of identity, especially in the religious area (Kroger & Green,
1996, p.483).
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Conclusion
The relationship between this adolescent stage of development and the
development of religious beliefs and activity can not be understated. Adolescent
development should be seen as having the potential to impact on the relationship
between religiosity and values. The period of adolescence is one which is, of its
nature, focussed on the re~examination of issues of values and must include an
examination of the individual's previous and possible future participation in
religious activity. As the individual faces these religious issues, a mature

commitment is able to be made to the religion which is seen to support that which
the adolescent values. As Marcia (1966) notes, however, the period of
adolescence is punctuated by a movement between the various stages of
moratorium, foreclosure, and diffusion en route to identity achievement. In this

way individuals are able to face the issues within the crisis of identity one at a
time. Until the crisis ofidentity includes issues of religion, the individual will not
necessarily display a mature and reasoned decision on religious issues. In this
way it is possible that the adolescent may not demonstrate the relationships
between religiosity and value types displayed in previous studies.
As value types are motivational, it may well be the case that the
development of values is stable, and the task of the adolescent is to find
organisations, people, and institutions which are seen as able to fult11 the already
established values. A certain amount of stability may be observed (Erikson, 1968)
as the individual resolves the crisis of each stage in a way which shows a certain
unity with all that has been previously resolved. The task of development is not to
constantly recreate the individual personality, but to develop, in harmony with all

.
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that has been previously achieved, the new potential which is evoked by each
stage's crisis. In this way, the adolescent is seen by Erikson (1977) to be in search
of"a new sense of continuity and sameness" (Erikson, 1977, p.235).
This understanding of the adolescent task of re-examining tho issues in a
sense of sameness is also reflected in Erikson's (1968) claims that the activity of
the adolescent revolves around the discovery of people and ideas to "have faith

in) which also means men [and women] and ideas in whose service it would seem
worth while to prove oneself trustworthy" (Erikson, 1968, p. 128-129). It is not
argued that the adolescent searches for new values, but rather that the adolescent
searches for ideals, people, and institutions which align with the values they
already have. It is only against an already reasonably defined set of values that
something is able to be judged "worthy of service" and people are judged "worthy
of trust". The re-examination of people's worth, personal career choices, and
religious and political beliefs is undertaken in such a way that assent is given to
these positions only in so much as these are supported by an already reasonably
well established set of values. Schwartz and Huismans (1995) argue this when
they suggest that "value priorities may influence individuals' commitment to the
religion they profess and (occasionally) their choice of a specific religion, because
religions provide opportunities or pose barriers to the attainment of valued goals"
(Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.88). In this way, the choice to participate in a
religious activity is determined by the already well-established value priorities
held by an individual, as well as the impact of the individual's stage of
development.

.:--.··."
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In this way, an examination of the value priorities of adolescents may well
provide some clue as to future activity, especially in the religious sphere. This is
of obvious interest to those involved in the development of young people through
religious schools. Clearly, while an individual may not be able to demonstrate the
developmental ability to make a mature commitment to a particular religion by the
end of his or her school life, the value priorities are somewhat established. These
values will either be supportive of, or discordant with, current and future
participation in religious activity. It is clearly of interest to the religious school,
whose influence in the area of student participation in religion should not be
underestimated (e.g., Hyde, 1990), to be able to better socialise the students with
values oupportive of future participation in religious activity.
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Table I
Value Domains and Descriptions (cf, Schwartz, 1992, p.S-12)

Motivational Types ofValues
Self-Direction

Description
Derived from need for mastery and
control, and autonomy and
independence. Includes
independent. thought and action.

Stimulation

Derived from perceived need for
variety and stimulation and has
goal of excitement, novelty and
challenge.

I

Hedonism

Derived from organisimic need for
pleasure.

Achievement

Defined by goal of personal success
through demonstrated competence.

Power

Similar to achievement in the self
esteem gained, but focuses on
attainm~nt of position within social
system.

Security

Derived from need for security,
safety stability or society and of
relatipnships.

Conformity (earlier labelled restrictive
conformity)

Deri~ed from the requirement that
individuals suppress behaviour that
might upset or harm others, or
violate social norms.

Tradition

Respect for the traditions and
customs of society.

Benevolence (earlier labelled prosocial)

Concern for the welfare of those
close in everyday interaction

Universalism (includes former type of
maturity)

Concern for the welfare of all
people and nature
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Table 2
Hypothesised Correlations Between Value Types and Religiosity (Schwartz &
Huismans, 1995, p.92-92)
Value Type

Hypothesised Correlation with religiosity

Tradition

Strong Position Correlation

Conformity

Positive Correlation

Benevolence

Positive Correlation

Security

Positive Correlation

Stimulation

Negative Correlation

Self-direction

Negative Correlation

Hedonism

Strong Negative Correlation

Universalism

Little or No Correlation:
direction not specified

Power

Little or No Correlation:
direction not specified

Achievement

Little or No Correlation:
direction not specified
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Table3
Actual Correlations Between Value Types and Religiosity For Mixed-Nationality
Sample (n=l716} and For German Sample (n-1807) (Schwartz & Huismans,
1995, p.98, 101)

Value Type

Correlation (n=l716)

Correlation (n=l807)

Tradition

.54

.37

Conformity

.30

.24

Benevolence

.15

.13

Security

.15

.14

Stimulation

-.34

-.32

Self-direction

-.33

-.18

Hedonism

-.39

-.25

Universalism

-.24

-.06

Power

-.08

-.06

Achievement

-.13

-.11

• All correlations statistically significant at alpha =.01
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Self-transcendence

Universalism

Benevolence

Self-Direction

Tradition

Stimulation

Hedonism

Achievement

Security

Power

Self-enhancement
Conservation

Openness to change

Figure I. Theoretical structure of relations among motivational Value Types,
where proximity indicates the degree of compatibility of Value Types. (Schwartz,
1992, p.45)
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Appendix
Individual Values and Associated Value Types (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz and
Bilsky, 1987, 1990)

Self-Direction
Freedom
Creativity
Independent
Choosing own goals
Curious
Self-respect
Stimulation
An exciting life
Daring
Hedonism
Pleasure
Enjoying life
Achievement
Ambitious
Influential
Capable
Successful
Intelligent
Self-respect

Puwer
Social power
Wealth
Authority
Preserving my public image
Social recognition
Conformity
Obedient
Self-discipline
Politeness
Honouring of parents and
elders
',\

Security
National security
Reciprocation of favours
Family security
Sense ofbelonging
Social order
Healthy
Clean
Tradition
Respect for tradition
Devout
Accepting my portion in life
Humble
Moderate

Benevolence
Helpful
Responsible
Forgiving
Honest
Loyal
Mature love
True friendship
Universalism
Equality
Unity with nature·
Wisdom
A world of beauty
Social justice
Broad-minded
Protecting the environment
A world at peace
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Abstract

The current work examined the relationship between religiosity and values in an
adolescent group. The participants (N=l()3) were students from a co-educational
Catholic secondary school in Perth, Western Australia (n=87), and from one of
four church-based youth groups (!!=16). There were fOrty-one males, aged
between 16 years and 4 months and 17 years and 11 months (M=16 years and 7
months), and sixty-three females, aged between 16 years and 4 months and 18
years and 9 months (M=16 years and 6 months). Each participant completed a
values survey and a measure of religiosity. The correlations between the value
types, as defined by Schwartz (1992), and religiosity were calculated. The
correlation between values and religiosity reached significant levels fur three
values, Hedonism (L= -.31 ), Stimulation (L= -.24) and Tradition (r = .37).
Comparisons were made between the current study and previous research,
extending the research on religiosity and values into an adolescent group. The
sample was then divided according to higher and lower religiosity, and
comparisons were made. An assessment of the effectiveness of the school in
conveying a specific values system was made on this basis. L, light of the
findings, suggestions for further research were made including an extension of the
current study to include a wider and more diverse sample, and the use of both an
extrinsic and intrinsic measure of religiosity with both adolescent and adult
groups.
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The primary aim ofthe religious school is not success of the sports field,
university entrance rates or even simple academic achievement. While ear.h of
these is important, and welcome in all schools, the religious school differs from
the non-religious school in that its primary aim is the socialisation of its students
into the value system of th.o sponsoring church. This is not an easy task, and must
include an understating of the areas of the psychology of religion, values, and
adolescent development. The religious school attempts to convey the dominant
culture in the light of the sponsoring church's values. It is with this in mind that
the current works seeks to briefly review the three areas of the psychology of
religion, values, and adolescent development, as well as the relationship between
them.
Recent work (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz &
Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) has
suggested that values are both universal and organised in a particular way.
Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) define values as having five features: they are
"concepts or beliefs, about desirable end states or behaviours, that transcend
specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviour or events, and are
ordered by relative importance" (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, p.55!). In this there is
little deviation from previous work on values (e.g., Rokeach, 1960, 1968, 1975),
however, this recent work has suggested an armngement of values which is
unique. Accordii<g to recent studies (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987;
Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990), values are both universal, and may be organised into
ten motivational value types. This organisation of value types t~nd individual
values is demonstrated in Table I. In this way, a relationship is seen between
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individual values, which either support or oppose various other individual values,
and between groups of values, which again either support or oppose other value
types. Thus, the individual values of An Exciting Life, A Varied Life, and Daring
are grouped into the value type Stimulation. This value type may be seen as
opposing the value types of Conformity and Tradition, but is seen as being similar
in content to, and therefore supporting of, the value types of Hedonism and SelfDirection. The proposed relationship between value types is demonstrated in
Figure I.
Another dimension to the religious school is the level of student
participation in the religious life of the educational community. Participation in
the religious rites of the sponsoring church is seen as a reflection of the level of
assent to the values of that church. As can been seen from an exploration of
adolescent devolopment, however, it would be unwise to suggest that mere
participation in the worship rituals of the church would necessarily be reflective of
the acceptance of the values of that church. It may well be the case that
participation is discordant with the student's values, and is motivated by quite
different values. Similarly, non-participation does not necessarily reflect a
rejection of the church's values. In both cases, the individual may well have not
yet developed a deep commitment to the religious institution, but may well still be
in the process of the exploration that is a vital part of this stage of development.
Any understanding of religiosity must, therefore, be able to incorporate this
flexibility.
The simplest conception of religiosity is that of a single dimension factor
and while there would seem to be some support for this position (Wulff, 1991) the
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greater amount of research literature argues for a multi-dimensional understanding
of religiosity (e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967; DeJong, Faulkner, & Warland, 1976;
Donahue, 1985; Francis, Lewis, Philipchalk, Lester, & Brown, 1995; Francis &
Stubbs, 1987; Gorsuch, 1984; Gorsuch, 1988; Gorsuch, Mylvaganam, Gorsuch, &
Johnson, 1997; Joseph & Lewis, 1997; Plante & Boccaccini, 1997; Trimble,
1997). Arguably the most significant development in the understanding of
religiosity has been the work by Allport and Ross (1967), which suggested that
religiosity operates on two levels. Based on research about religiosity and
prejudice, Allport and Ross {1967) suggested that a fundamental distinction could
be made in religiosity: that of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity.
For Allport and Ross {1967) the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
religiosity was based on the motivation for participation in religious activity.
Those motivated by personal gain were demonstrating extrinsic religiosity, while
those motivated by more ideological reasons were demonstrating intrinsic
religiosity. More simply put, the intrinsic 'lived' their religion, while the extrinsic
'used' their religion (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.434). While developments have
been suggested since the early work of Allport and Ross (1967), the basic

distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity remains.
Thus, while it may be possible to determine if a person is religious or not
on the basis of a single question, it is far more useful to be able to understand the
impact that an individual's religion has in the manner in which that individual
lives out their life. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity is
seen as useful as it enables a conceptualisation of the level of religious activity as
well as some understanding of the level of religious commitment. While adults

... -:'

44

are likely to differ in their motivation for participation in religious activity,
adolescents are especially likely to participate in religious activity for a wide
range of extrinsic reasons because oftheir level of maturity in the area of religious
beliefs and commitment. This understanding of religiosity is, therefore, a useful
one when addressing adolescent participation in religious activity.
The established theory of adolescent development stems from the work by
Erikson (1968, 1977), which, while not specifically a theory of adolescent
development but rather that of the whole lifespan, has none-the-less initiated a
great deal of research on the period of adolescence. Erikson's (1968, 1977) theory
of development is based on the 'epigenetic principle', where by development of
ego and personality is seen to follow a clear plan. The successful negotiation of
each stage of development is both dependent on the successful completion on the
previous stages, and necessary for the successful navigation of all subsequent
stages. Similarly, the issues raised at each stage are part of a plan, and arc raised
only when appropriate, and not before. In the same way, the issues central to each
stage of development are important foundations for subsequent stages.
Each stage is characterised by one important issue, for example the issue
of identity for the adolescent. Successful personality and ego development is
dependent on that issue being raised and appropriately dealt with at the right time.
This process of sharply bringing the relevant issue into focus is called a crisis by
Erikson (1968, 1977). This crisis is not seen by Erikson (1968, 1977) as negative,
but rather as a "radical change in perspective" (Erikson, 1968, p. 96}. The crisis is
merely the way that the issue central to that stage is brought into the attention of
the individual so that successful resolution may take place.
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The successful resolution of each crisis brings with it a virtue closely
associated with that issue. For example, the adolescent is faced with the crisis of
identity, where by issues of self-identity are addressed. The adolescent must
examine how he or she looks to themselves, and to significant others. Issues of
occupation and of political and religious beliefs must be examined and decide
upon. The virtue of fidelity is closely associated with this stage. Just as each
crisis is characterised as an opportunity for growth and as a change in perspective,

the resolution of each results in the development of a new function or
characteristic. For example, as the adolescent achieves a sense of personal
identity, the virtue of fidelity is also achieved. In this way, as the adolescent
determines what is important, what is worthy of acceptance and what is to be
taken on as part of the new identity, the adolescent is also able to develop the
faithfulness to maintain those things which have been determined to be important.
With this new forming identity comes the virtue of fidelity, by which the
adolescent is able to express a commitment to the ideals now part of their identity
and a loyalty to the people now regarded as important.
Hence, the period of adolescence is one characterised by issues ofidentity.
Concern with how an individual looks to others is important. This period is a time
during which the accepted rules and beliefs are re-examined. Occupational
concerns are of great importance, well beyond the issue of mere remuneration.
Political and religious beliefs must be challenged. The development of identity is,
itself, a process with stages (see Marcia, 1966). Different aspects of identity, such
as occupational and religious beliefs, are addressed at different times, and a
suspension of thought about beliefs is observed {Erikson, 1959; Erikson, 1968;
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Erikson, 1982; Marcia, 1966; Markstrom-Adams, Hofstra, & Dougher, 1994).
Towards the end of this period, the individual begins to show a mature
commitment to those beliefs and people that have shown themselves worthy of
acceptance and support. The development of fidelity is seen. For the school
attempting to convey a set of values, the period towards the end of the school life
is of greatest significance.
The current work, therefore, sees a direct connection between values,
religiosity, and development. Clearly, as values are motivational, the level of
religious involvement will be determined to a great extent by the value priorities
of the individual. Similarly, as the individual may not have yet been faced with a
crisis that demands a clarification of religious behefs, or at least will not have yet
resolved that crisis, it may be usefully assumed that the value priorities expressed
by an adolescent will precede a mature commitment to religious activity, while
being supportive of that commitment. While Hyde (1990) has demonstrated the
significant imp•.ct of the •chool on student religiosity, it must be clear that factors
other than the school impact on student values and religiosity, and this
relationship is characterised by Figure 2. In this way, while the influence of
family, society, development, and personal values can be seen to impact on
individual religiosity, the complex way in which the school has an impact, both
directly and indirectly, can also be seen.
The performance of the school as an institution which is charged both by
the parents and by the sponsoring church to convey a particular set of values,
however, cannot be understated. In as much as it can, the school must be able to
justify its existence by asserting that it does have an impact on student values and
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student religiosity. The current work, therefore, sets to examine the school's
ability to achieve its aim of impacting effectively on student values and
religiosity.
In light of the understanding of religiosity outlined previously, it was
decided in the current work to improve the procedure of the previous studies
(Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) with regard to the
measurement of religiosity. Roccas and Schwartz (1997) argue that adopting a
unidimensional understanding of religiosity is appropriate because that study
measured a general sense, rather than specific components, of religiousness. The
majority of research literature reviewed, however, demands an understanding of
religiosity as a multidimensional concept (e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967; Argyle &
Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Donahue, 1985; Francis, 1989; Francis et al., 1995; Francis
& Stubbs, 1987; Gorsuch, 1984; Gorsuch, 1988; Gorsuch et al., 1997). Further,

Schwartz and Huismans (1995) argue that religiosity is the measure of the "degree
of commitment to religion" (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.88). As that study
sought to examine the relationship between this commitment and values, it can
safely be assumed that the measure of religiosity used was at least implicitly
measuring a degree oflived commitment, rather than a mere attachment to the
religion for social reasons. Clearly, in light of the distinction between extrinsic
and intrinsic religiosity offered by Allport and Ross ( 1967), at least some attempt
to differentiate between an intrinsic and an extrinsic commitment to religion is
necessary.
The current work utilises a definition based on an assumption about the
multi-dimensional nature of religiosity, and therefore seeks to measure the
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religiosity of the participants on the basis of a more detailed questionnaire which
includes an attempt to examine religiosity on an intrinsic scale. The reasons for
this were three-fold. Firstly, somewhat in opposition to the previous studies, it
was felt that it was not appropriate to measure religiosity as a single~item question
in this case.

Single~item

measures of religiosity are seen to be useful in cases

where religion has already been seen to have an effect but when it is not the
central concern (e.g., Gorsuch, 1988; Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989). Clearly, in
the current study, religiosity is the central concern and on this basis alone a singleitem questionnaire would seem to be inappropriate. Secondly, the nature of the
study demands that account be taken of the lived commitment to religion: in
essence, the nature of the study demands that religiosity be measured in a way that
includes an intrinsic dimension. The focus of the current study is that ofthe
impact that a commitment to religion has on values, and vice versa. It is
presumed that a purely extrinsic commitment to religion will not impact on values
in the same way that an intrinsic commitment will, and it was therefore seen to be
necessary to differentiate between a "general religious conviction" and an
assessment of the "social importance of religion" (Miller & Eells, 1998, p.252).
Thirdly, the focus of the current work on adolescents adds a new dimension.
Erikson (1968, 1977) argues that the period of adolescence is one within which it
is necessary for the adolescent to examine questions of identity. This examination
of identity must include an examination of issues such as values and religious
beliefs (Marcia, 1966). In light of this, a measure of religiosity must be sensitive
enough to differentiate between a level of religious activity motivated by a
genuine concern and commitment to the values of the religion, and a level of
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activity motivated by parental or peer pressure. A single-item question about
church attendance, as was the case in previous studies (e.g., Schwanz &
Huismans, 1995), cannot capture the essence of a lived religious commitment, and
this is panicularly the case in the lives of adolescents.
Based on previous research, it is predicted that a relationship between
values, as conceptualised and measured by Schwanz ( 1992), and religiosity will
emerge. This relationship between values and religiosity is demonstrated in Table
2. On the first level, the current study seeks to el<lend that previous research to
examine adolescents' values and religiosity. It is therefore hypothesised that,
allowing for a small amount of variance due to the emotional immaturity of the
panicipants, the relationship between values and religiosity within the adolescent
group examined will not differ greatly from the relationship between religiosity
and values found in the previous research (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwanz &
Huismans, 1995).
The motivational nature of values suggests that value priorities will be
adopted prior to any real commitment to a religious organisation is made, and that
the value priorities adopted will influence the individual's religious commitment.
As adolescents develop at different rates, it is assumed that some of the
panicipants will have made a sincere religious commitment and others will have
rejected religion, while others will not have come to a mature conclusion. The
task of the religious school, however, is to socialise all its students into the value
system of the sponsoring church. While the school may be seen to be successful
in regards to those students tltat have made a commitment to a panicular religion,
there is a greater number of students for whom that mature commitment is not
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possible during their enrollment at the school. As adolescent development theory
suggests, the crisis of identity associated with religious issues must be faced, but
may well be faced at a later point in the period of adolescence (Kroger & Green,
1996; Flum, 1994). Indeed, it may not be possible for many adolescents to make
the mature commitment demanded of them prior to leaving the school (Fium,
1994, p. 490). The challenge before the school is therefore to ensure that the
values of the adolescents who are not able to make this mature commitment to
religion during their period at school are at least compatible with a commitment to
religion which may be made later. In this way, the effectiveness of the religious
school may be assessed by examining the differences between the value priorities
of the students who have made mature religious commitment, and those who have
not. If the school has been successful in its task of socialising its students into the
value system of the sponsoring church, students who are able to make this mature
commitment to their religion will have similar values to \hose students who are
not able to make this mature religious committment. Assuming the success ofthe
school in socialising all of its students into a values system compatible with a
mature commitment to the sponsoring church, it is hypothesised that no difference
will be observed in the values of the higher and lower religiosity students.
Method
Participants
The participants (N=I03) were senior school students from a Catholic coeducational secondary school (!!=87), and from one of four Catholic church-based
youth groups (n=l6) in Perth, Western Australia. There were forty-one males,
aged between 16 years and 4 months and 17 years and II months (M=I6 years
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and 7 months), and sixty-three females, aged between 16 years and 4 months and
18 years and 9 months (M=J6 years and 6 months). All Senior students at the
school were invited to participate, and the school was selected both because it was

of average size and because of its convenience for access by the researcher. All
youth groups located in the North of Perth were contacted, and all students in their
final year of school were invited to participate. Youth group members were
included to ensure that a range of religiosity scores including the higher end of
possible scores could be obtained.
Materials
The participants were administered the Schwartz (1991) Values Survey
(SVS), within which individuals note the importance of 56 values in their lives on
a nine point Likert scale, from -1 meaning opposed to the participants' values,
through to 7 for those values which are of paramount importance. These
individual values are then organised into motivational value types, according to
the arrangement of values proposed by Schwartz (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz &
Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990) (see Appendix A). The mean of the
individual values is obtained to give a score for each of the value types indicating
its importance. The individual values and their associated value types are listed in
Appendix B.
Participants were also administered the Francis Scale of Attitudes to
•Christianity (Short form) (FSAC) (Francis & Stubbs, 1987). In this participants
mark, on a five point Likert scale, the level of their agreement with eight
statements about the Christian faith, such as "I like to learn about God very
much", and "I know Jesus helps me". Three statements ("I think the bible is out
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of date", "I find it hard to believe in God", and "I think going to church is a waste
of time") were negatively coded (see Appendix C). Also on a five point scale,
participants also indicated their agreement with a single question about their
perception oftheir own religiousness ("I am a religious person"). Participants

were also asked the note the level of church attendance on a five point scale
(weekly, monthly, a couple of times a year, rarely, never), and their frequency of
personal prayer (daily, weekly, monthly, rarely, never). Participants also
indicated their religion, age, and gender.
Procedure

Following approval of the project from the University School of
Psychology Ethics Committee, the Principal, and all senior teachers involved, the
participants in the school group were given the information sheet in the week prior
to 1- ,ing asked to complete the questionnaire. A notice was placed in the school

newsletter, which goes to every home, ir.dicating that a questionnaire would be
completed, and requesting parents 'with objections or questions to contact the
researcher or supervisor. There were no objections.

In the school, all questionnaires were administered in groups by the
researcher in class time over two days. For the youth group participants the
questionnaires were administered during their youth group meeting. All
participants were given an information sheet prior to the questionnaire being
administered (see Appendix D), and were asked to complete a consent form (see
Appendix E). All participants were given !he opportunity to ask questions before
and after the administration ofthe surveys. The order of the SVS and the FSAC
was varied with half the questionnaires having the SVS first and half having the
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FSAC first. The front page, giving general instructions and with biographical
questions about age aod gender, remained the same.
In the case of the youth groups, the adult leaders of the youth groups were
contacted, sent information sheets, and arrangements were made for the researcher
to attend the youth groups over a six week period. The participants in the youth
groups were given the information sheet and consent form, and completed the
questionnaire immediately. All were given the opportunity to ask questions
before aod after the administration of the surveys.
Results
All data from the completed questionnaires were entered into SPSS for
Windows. Individual values were summed to give value type scores following the
procedure outlined by Schwartz (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987;
Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990). For example, the mean of the scores for the specific
values An Exciting Life, A Varied Life, and Daring is obtained to give a score for
the value type Stimulation.
The mean of the individual FSAC items was obtained to give a religiosity
score for each participant. The descriptive statistics for the FSAC scores, the
responses to the questions about church attendance, prayer frequency, and
agreement with the statement, "I am a religious person", are indicated in Table 3.
The correlations between the value types and the religiosity scores, as well
as between the value types and the three single-item religiosity questions, were
obtained. With a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .005, four correlations
reached statistically significant levels: Hedonism, and Stimulation were
correlated with the FSAC, Tradition was correlated with the FSAC, the Stated

.

-'.

:: '.

54

level of Religious Feeling, and with Prayer Frequency, and Conformity was
correlated only with Prayer Frequency. The range of correlations, indicating those
that have reached a level of statistical significance, are displayed in Table 4.
Previous research (e.g., Francis, & Stubbs, 1987; Francis, 1989; Francis,
Lewis, Philipchalk, Lester & Brown, 1995) has not provided any normative level
to indicate a point at which high intrinsic religiosity is assumed. Similarly, data
collected from an adult sample could not easily be compared as the measure used
differed slightly from the version commonly used with adolescents. In order to be
able to examine any differences between the value priorities of those who
demonstrate a level of mature and lived commitment to their religion, and those
who do not, the group was divided into two according to FSAC scores, with
scores of3. 75 of higher constituting higher religiosity, and other scores
constituting lower religiosity.
The cutoff point used to distinguish between high intrinsic religious
commitment and low was based on reference to the scale labels. A mean score of
four would be obtained if an individual indicated agreement with all statements of
the FSAC. It was felt, however, that a certain degree of uncertainty could be
expected and tolerated in an adolescent sample, without any real decrease in lived
religious commitment. The score chosen could be obtained, therefore, if an
individual indicated uncertain for two statements and agreement for all others. A
series of independent !-tests were conducted (alpha= .01) and indicated that the
groups differed significantly on the FSAC scores,! (87.30) = -13.57, ll < .001, and
the stated level of religious commitment,! (98.85) = -7.63, ll < .001. The groups
did not differ at a statistically significant level on the measure of ch~rch
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attendance, 1 (101) = -1.64, R=.II, or level of personal prayer,! (71.96) = -2.15, ll
=

.03.
Having divided the group into those with higher religiosity (n = 42, M =

4.21, SD = .33), and those without (n = 62, M = 2.68, SD = .79), a series of! tests
were conducted to determine the difference between value types for the two
groups, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .005. All statistical
assumptions were met. As shown in Table 5, only two value types were
statistically significantly different, Hedonism,! (101) = 3.48, and Stimulatio!l,!
(101) = 2.99.
The correlations between FSAC scores and value types for the two groups
were obtained separately. The results of the ! tests and the correlations between
religiosity scores and value types are also displayed in Table 5. The value type
Hedonism, (lower religiosity group M = 5.52, higher religiosity group M = 4.71)
was negatively and non-significantly correlated for both groups, but a stronger
negative correlation was observed for the higher group, while the value type
Stimulation (lower group M= 5.11, higher group M = 4.32) was negativity
correlated with religiosity for the lower group, but positively correlated for the
higher group, although again these results were not statistically significant.

Discussion
An examination of the correlations between religiosity and value types for
the whole group suggests some support for the first hypothesis, although in many
cases the results fail to reach statistically significant levels. While individual
differences may be observed, tbe similarities between this sample and previous
studies does suggest some support for the theory proposed about the relationship
•

I

.

m~i;1;~i'!;c ; ...,. . .,,

".-.

..

:_::.;>_;-

56

between religiosity and values (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Huismans,
1995), although in only three cases were the correlations between religiosity and
value type consistent with that predicted by the previous studies: Hedonism,
Stimulation, and Tradition ..
With respect to the differences observed between the current sample and
previous research, some may be explained by reference to adolescent development
theory. Others may be explained by reference to this specific sample, and may
well not occur in other samples of adolescents. For example, in the previous
study (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995), the correlation between religiosity and the
motivational value type of Self-Direction was found to be a negative one.
Schwartz and Huismans (1995) argue that Self-Direction is something of a threat
to religiosity, because it "emphasises openness to change ... [and] may threaten
social order and increase individual uncertainty" (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995,
p.92-93). In an adolescent group, however, openness to change, challenge of
societal order and a sense of individual uncertainty is a vital part of the
exploration necessary for the resolution of the identity crisis that Erikson (1967,
1977) suggests is indicative of that developmental stage. Indeed, a sense of
individual self-direction is promoted in schools as the students struggle to select
subjects and prepare for work and study at a post-secondary level. This
independent thought and activity is a stated part ofthe curriculum. (Curriculum
Council, 1998). Hence, rather than Self-Direction being seen in the adolescent as
negatively correlated with an acceptance of religion, valuing Self-Direction
should been seen as characteristic of all adolescents, regardless of their level of
religiosity.
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Differences are also observed in the relationship between Religiosity and
Universalism (moderately negative in previous studies and positive in the current
study), Conformity (moderately positive in previous studies and marginal in the
current study), and Security (positive in previous studies and marginally negative
in the current study). These can be explained by an examination of the issues of
religiosity in subsequent paragraphs.
Following the partitioning of the sample into higher and lower intrinsic
religiosity groups, a number of differences can be seen in the correlations between
religiosity and different value types for the two groups. What is somewhat
surprising, however, is the direction of a number of the correlations which are
different to those predicted by Schwartz and Huismans (I 995). For example, it is
predicted that the relationship between religiosity and both the value types
Tradition and Conformity will be strongly positive, and that the relationship
between religiosity and the value type Stimulation will be strongly negative
(Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). It could be suggested, then, that the group with
higher religiosity would show a strong reflection of these relationships. In fact,
however, the reverse is the case. While the lower religiosity group conforms to
the predictions made, the higher group does not. In this way Tradition has a
strong positive correlation with religiosity for the lower group, but no correlation
for the higher religiosity group. Similarly, Conformity has a strong positive
correlation with religiosity for the lower religiosity group, but no correlation with
religiosity for the more religious group. Finally, Stimulation has a negative
correlation with religiosity for the lower religiosity group and an equally strong
positive relationship with religiosity for the higher religiosity group, the
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difference between the means but not the correlations for this value type reaching
statistically significant levels.
In attempting to understand the differences between these two groups it is
necessary to briefly examine the theological framework upon which Schwartz and
Huismans (1995) have made their predictions about the relationship between
value types and religiosity. It is well beyond the scope of the current work to do
anything more than briefly glance at these issues, and the discussion will be
somewhat specific to the sample. It is not possible, for example, to make
assumptions about all religions, and therefore the discussion will focus only on
Christian and specifically Catholic theology, as this is the background of both the
school, and the vast majority of the students who form the sample.
Contemporary Catholic theology stresses the importance of personal
conversion and a committed acceptance ofthe life-changing aspects of the Gospel
message, although the theories of the stages of faith development would argue that
individuals will not always be able to demonstrate this level of mature
commitment to religion (e.g., Kohlberg, 1968; Fowler, 1981 ). Theologically,
however, it is not enough that the Christian attends services or makes an assent to
the major doctrines of the Church. A real commitment to Jesus and the Church
demands an intemalisation of the Gospel message of justice and liberation (e.g.,
Hogan, 1993; JohoPaul, 1989, 1993; Haring, 1978; Rahner, 1978). This is
central to Hogan's (1993) work on morals and ethics. In it he writes:
[The ChurchI strives to help people grow beyond the level of roleconformity of a morality from outside, to the level of a truly loving
response from a morality from inside .... [Christianity1is not limited to the
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transmission of a set of fixed moral truths, but is rather a process of
stimulating an internal appreciation of the value that is to be realised, of
perceiving it as a challenge or invitation to authenticity, so that one can
realise it as part of one's true response to the neighbour and a genuine
development of oneself (Hogan, 1993, p.43)
This is also clearly reflected in Haring's (1978) treatise on morals and ethics. In it
he writes that freedom, rather than a restrictive conformity to norms, is the key
concept for understanding ethics and Christianity. His understanding of tradition,
and its place in the religious sphere, is somewhat divergent to that of Schwartz
and Huismans (1995). Rather than the respectfu~ moderate and accepting vision
of tradition offered by Schwartz and Huismans (1995), Hiiring argues that "mature
Christians are not only critical towards past traditions and mores but are extremely
critical towards the present modes and fads. They also do their best to embody
their informed and critical response to the signs of the times in new mores, new
customs and new ways ofthinking" (Hiiring, 1978, p.310).
There is nothing that theology can fault in Schwartz and Huismans' (1995)
assertion that religions foster transcendental concerns, however, their
conceptualisation of the manner in which this is expressed is problematic. While
religions seek to orient people towards the divine and the transcendent, it is not by
"promulgating religious creeds, moral proscriptions and ritual requirements,
(Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.91) per se, but by encouraging a lived
commitment to God, which may be expressed by behavior which is guided by
these mores and proscriptions. In contemporary Christian theology the emphasis
is on freedom, not slavish and unthinking submission, in opposition to the view
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offered by Schwartz and Huismans (1995). lfreligiosity is a measure of a real,
lived commitment to the religion and that for which it stands in the manner
envisioned by Haring (1978), Hogan (1993) and others, it would be impossible to
accept that religiosity will be positively correlated with "values that emphasise the
statu.s quo [such as] Tradition, Conformit~ and Securit~ ... [and negatively to]
values that emphasise change and following oue's independent judgements ...
[such as] Stimulation and Self-Direction" (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.91-92)
In this way the differences between the groups may be explained. Value

types which reflect submission and limit freedom, such as Tradition, Conformity
and to a lesser extent Security, will not be correlated positively with a religiosity
which is lived and committed, only with a religiosity which is extrinsic, simplistic
and legalistic, and 'fundamentalist' (Haring, 1978). Only those for whom religion
is a set of rules to be followed, rather than a lived commitment, will demonstrate
the correlations with value types which reflect submission. Religiosity, as
conceptualised by Haring (1978), and which is based on freedom and not slavish
subntission, will correlate with value types which encourage independence, such
as Self-Direction and Stimulation. In each ofthese cases, the higher religiosity
group has demonstrated stronger positive correlations than the lower group.
With regard to the two value types concerned with care for others,
Benevolence and Universalism, Schwartz and Huismans (1995) have suggested
that the former will correlate only weakly, although positively, with religiosity,
while the later will have a near zero correlation. In the current study,
.

Benevolence is significantly correlasted fer the higher religiosity group, but not
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the higher group. The value type Universalism is of particular importance in
illustrating the differences both between the two groups, and between different
conceptualisations of religiosity. Schwartz and Huismans (1995) argue that
Universalism will have a poor correlation with religiosity because "bringing the
members into exclusivist, solidary groups, reduces the importance attributed to
concern for all others" (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p. 102). This distinction
between a care for those within the religion and a care for those outside of it was
the basis fur the original studies conducted by Allport and Ross (1967) on
prejudice and religiosity which lead to the distinction between an extrinsic and an
intrinsic religiosity. This distinction remains, and explains well the differences
observed both between the two groups in the current study and between this study
group and the previous studies.
The differences in the correlations between the two groups may be
explained, therefore, by reference to the philosophical framework upon which the
direction of the correlations are predicted, by reference to the intrinsic/extrinsic
religiosity distinction, or even by merely suggesting that the relationship between
these values and religiosity is not a liner one, although reference to the
Scatterplots of the correlations between the FSAC scores and the value types do
not suggest a non-liner relationship (see Appendix F). Regardless of the
explanation, it remains that the relationship between values and religiosity would
be clarified by taking these factors into account in further studies.
As to the second hypothesis about the success of the religious school: on
the basis of the assumption offered about values, the data suggest support for the
work of this religious school in its attempt to convey the values of the sponsoring
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church. Only two of the value types were significantly different, indicating that,
for the most part, the students did not differ significantly in their value priorities.
The differences that were observed may be explained in the differences that would
be expected to be observed between those with an intrinsic and lived commitment
to their religion and those who commitment is more extrinsic. The work of the

Catholic school would best be focussed on the provision of various opportunities
for the adolescents to be challenged to think deeply about identity issues of
religion, and in this way to encourage a movement from extrinsic to an intrinsic
commitment in their students. As to values, however, it would seem that a

general support for the values of the church are being conveyed, although a level
of self-control would temper the high value for Hedonism in both groups.
Clearly the current study cannot be generalised widely. It is limited by the
size of the sample, the possible geographic confounds, the culture of the single
school used, and by the fact that only one religion was examined. The current
study does, however, suggest avenues for further research. Certainly, the impact
of adolescent development on values and religiosity is an area worthy of future
investigation. While a theoretical basis may be argued for the links between
development and values and religiosity, further study would develop the strength
of this theoretical relationship.
Further study in the area of the definition of religiosity is also warra.<ted.
Clearly, the way in which religiosity is conceptualised and measured has the
potential to have a significant impact in studies examining the relationship
between religiosity and values. The current study would seem to indicate that a
lived commitment to religion, as measured by an intrinsic measure, is a stronger
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indicator of the values motivating an individual's behaviour than an extrinsic
measure. In further studies on the relationship between religiosity and values it
would seem that stronger effects would be observed using a measure of intrinsic
religiosity rather than an extrinsic one. Similarly, it would seem appropriate to
ensure that the level of religiosity measured is one motivated by a real
involvement in, and support of, the values system of the church rather than a level
of religiosity which may well have little to do with supporting the church and its
doctrine, and more to do with social advantage. It would seem to be useful if an
examination of the theoretical base upon which predictions about the strength and
direction of the correlations between religiosity and values are made, in light of
the differences observed in the current study.
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Table I
Value Domains and Descriptions (cf, Schwartz, 1992, p.S-12)

Motivational Types ofValues
Self-Direction

Description
Derived from need for mastery and
control, and autonomy and
independence. Includes
independent thought and action.

Stimulation

Derived from perceived need for
variety and stimulation and has
goal of excitement, novelty and
challenge.

Hedonism

Derived from organisimic need for
pleasure.

Achievement

Defined by goal of personal success
through demonstrated competence.

Power

Similar to achievement in the self
esteem gained, but focuses on
attainment of position within social
system.

Security

Derived from need for security,
safety stability or society and of
relationships.

Conformity (earlier labelled restrictive
confonnity)

Derived from the requirement that
individuals suppress behaviour that
might upset or harm others, or
violate social norms.

Tradition

Respect for the traditions and
customs of society.

Benevolence (earlier labelled prosocial)

Concern for the welfare ofthose
close in everyday interaction

Universalism (includes fanner type of
maturity)

Concern for the welfare of all
people and nature
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Table 2
H)ljlothesised Correlations Between Value Types and Religiosity (Schwartz &
Huisrnans, 1995, p.92)
-;-;-::-:;:-----;;---::--:-:-,----;-::---:-:;--;:-·-

Value Type

Hypothesised Correlation with religiosity

Tradition

Strong Position Correlation

Conformity

Positive Correlation

Benevolence

Positive Correlation

Security

Positive Correlation

Stimulation

Negative Correlation

Self-direction

Negative Correlation

Hedonism

Strong Negative Correlation

Universalism

Little or No Correlation:
direction not specified

Power

Little or No Correlation:
direction not specified

Achievement

Little or No Correlation:
direction not specified

-
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Religiosity Measures
Possible
Range

Observed
Range

.99

1-5

1-5

3.03

1.38

1-5

1-5

Church Attendance

2.50

1.39

1-5

I -5

Prayer Frequency

3.13

1.42

1-5

1-5

Achievement

5.06

.79

-1 -7

3.00-6.67

Benevolence

5.22

.82

-1 -7

2.86-7.00

Conformity

4.57

1.15

-1 -7

1.50-7.00

Hedonism

5.19

1.22

-1 -7

2.00-7.00

Power

3.28

1.12

-1 -7

.40-5.60

Security

4.72

.87

-1 -7

2.71 -6.43

SelfDirection

5.19

.83

-1 -7

3.50 -7.00

Stimulation

4.79

1.37

-1 -7

.50-7.00

Tradition

3.62

1.23

-1-7

.60-5.60

Universalism

4.69

.96

-1-7

2.00-7.00

Measure

Mean

Std. Deviation

FSAC Scores

3.29

Stated level of religious
feeling
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Table 4
Correlations Between Religiosity Measures and Value T)'lles

Value Type

FSAC

Stated level of

Church

Prayer

Score

religious feeling

attendance

frequency

Achievement

-.OS

-.10

-.04

.18

Benevolence

.09

.07

-.02

.12

Conformity

.07

-.02

.OS

.28.

Hedonism

-.31 •

-.18

.02

.02

.OS

.02

.03

.17

-.04

-.OS

-.08

.13

.02

.02

-.II

-.09

-.24.

-.21

-.13

-.03

Power
Security
SelfDirection
Stimulation
Tradition

.37.

.31*

Universalism

.09

.16

• Indicates statistical significance. Bonferroni adjusted alpha= .005.

.22
-.20

.32.
-.10
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Table 5
T-Test Scores of Differences Between Yalue Types. and Correlations Between
FSAC Scores and Value Types. for Higher and Lower Religiosity Groups.

FSACNalue Type CorrelationValue Type
---~--··--····-

Achievement

I Score (df=!Ol)

Higher Group

Lower Group

---·---·-..·-··-··-·--·---------·..···.09
1.25
.05

Benevolence

.09

.39*

.09

Conformity

.67

.02

.24

Hedonism

3.48**

-.16

-.09

.18

-.23

.20

l.l7

.IS

.07

.85

.19

.10

2.99**

.13

-.10

Power
Security
SelfDirection
Stimulation
Tradition
Universalism

-2.30

-.03

.43*

-.58

.18

.05

Statistically significant results are indicated • (alpba- .05) and •• (Bonferroni adjusted alpba
.005).
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Self-transcendence

Universalism

Benevolence

Tradition

Self-Direction

Stimulation

Hedonism

Achievement

Security

Power
Self-enhancement

Openness to change

Conservation

Figure I. Theoretical structure of relations among motivational value types, where
proximity indicates the degree of compatibility of value types. (Schwartz, 1992,
p.45)
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Ego Development

Individual
Religiosity

Society

l
Individual's
Values

School

~Family~
Figure 2: Relationship of variables impacting on student religiosity, showing the
impact of the student's values, society, ego development, the impact of the family
both directly and through both the choice of school and through the influence on
values, and the influence of the school itself.
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Appendix A:

PERSONAL VALUES QUESTIONNAIRE
INSTRUCTIONS
In this section you are to ask yourself: ''What values are important to ME as guiding
principles in MY life, and what values arc less important to me?" There arc two lists of
values on the following pages. These values come from different cultures. In the
parentheses following each value is an explanation that may help you to understand its
mearung.
Your task is to rate how important each value is for you ~! guiding principle in
YOUR life. Use the rating scale below:

0-means the value is not at all important, it is not relevant as a guiding principle for you.
3-means the value is important.
6-means the value is very important.
The higher the number (0, 1,2,3,4,5,6), the more important the value is as a guiding
principle in YOUR life.
·1 is for rating any values opposed to the principles that guide you.
7 is for rating a value of supreme importance as a guiding principle in your life;
ordinarily there are no more than two such values.

In the space before each value, write the number (-1,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7) that indicates the
importance of that value for you, personally. Try to distinguish as much as possible
between the values by using all the numbers. You will, of course, need to use numbers
more than once.
AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is:
of
very
supreme
important importance

opposed
tomy not
values important

-I

0

I

2

3

4

5

6

7

Before you begin, read values 1 to 30, choose the one that is most important to you and
rate its importance. Next, choose the value that is most opposed to your values and rate it
-1. Ifthere is no such value, choose the value least important to you and rate it 0 to 1,
according to its importance. Then rate the I~st of the values (to 30).
VALUES LIST I
I _EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
2 _INNER HARMONY (at peace with myself)
3 __ SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance)
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4 __ PLEASURE (gratification of desires)
5 __ FREEDOM (freedom of action and thought)
6 __ A SPIRITUAL LIFE (emphasis on spiritual not material matters)
7 __ SENSE OF BELONGING (feeling that others care about me)
8 __ SOCIAL ORDER (stability of society)
9 __ AN EXCITING LIFE (stimulating experiences)
IO_MEANING OF LIFE(a purpose of life)
ll__ POLITENESS (courtesy, good manners)

I2__ WEAL1H (material possessions, money)
13__ NATIONAL SECURITY (protection of my nation from enemies)
I4__ SELF-RESPECT (be1iefin one's own worth)
15__ RECIPROCATION OF FAVOURS (avoidance of indebtedness)
16__ CREATMTY (uniqueness, imagination)
17__ A WORLD AT PEACE (freeofwarandconflict)
18__ RESPECT FOR TRADITION (preservation of time-honoured customs)
19__ MATURE LOVE (deep emotional & spiritual intimacy)
20__ SELF-DISCIPLINE (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)
2l __ DETACHMENT (from worldly concerns)
22__ FAMILY SECURITY (safety for loved ones)
23 __ SOCIAL RECOGNmON (respect, approval by others)
24__ UNITY WITII NATURE (fitting into nature)
25 __ A VARIED LIFE (filled with challenge, novelty and change)
26__ WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)
27_ AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command)
28 __ TRUE FRIENDS!HP (close, supportive friends)
29__ A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)
30__ SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, care for the weak)
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VALVES LIST II
Now rate how important each of the following values is for you as~ guiding
principle in YOUR life. These values are phrased as ways of acting that may be
more or less important for you. Once again, try to distinguish as much as possible
between the values by using all the numbers.
Before you begin, read values 31 to 56, choose the one that is most important to
you and rate its importance. Next, choose the value that is most opposed to your

values, or--ifthere is no such value--choose the value least important to you, and
rate it -1, 0, or I, according to its importance. Then rate the rest of the values.
AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is:
opposed
to my not
values important
-I

0

I

of
very

supreme

important importance
2

3

4

5

7

6

31 __ 1NDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
32 __ MODERATE (avoiding extremes offeeling & action)
33_ LOYAL (faithful to my friends, group)
34__ AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)
35__ BROAD-MINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)
36__ HUMBLE (modest, self-effacing)
37_DARING (seeking adventure, risk)
38__ PROTECTING TIIE ENVIRONMENT (preserving nature)
39__ 1NFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people and events)
40_HONOURING OF PARENTS AND ELDERS (showing respect)
41 __ CHOOSING OWN GOALS (selecting own purposes)
42__ HEALTilY (not being sick physically or mentally)
43 __ CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient)

·,

44__ ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE (submitting to life's circumstances)
45 __ HONEST (genuine, sincere)
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46_ PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE (protecting my "fuce")
47__ OBEDIENT (dutiful, meeting obligations)

48_ INTELLIGENT (logical, thinking)
49__ HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)
50__ ENJOYING LIFE (enjoying food, sex, leisure, etc.)
51 __ DEVOUT (holding to religious faith & belief)

52__ RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)
53

CURIOUS (interested in everything, exploring)

54

FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)

55__ SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals)
56__ CLEAN (neat, tidy)

'··' '_.· '·--
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AppendixB
Individual Values and Associated Value Types (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz and
Bilsky, 1987, 1990)
Self-Direction
Freedom
Creativity
Independent
Choosing own goals
Curious
Self-respect
Stimulation
An exciting life
Daring
Hedonism
Pleasure
Enjoying life
Achievement
Ambitious
Influential
Capable
Successful
Intelligent
Self-respect

Security
National security
Reciprocation of favours
Family security
Sense of belonging
Social order
Healthy
Clean
Tradition
Respect for tradition
Devout
Accepting my portion in life
Humble
Moderate
Benevolence
Helpful
Responsible
Forgiving
Honest
Loyal
Mature love
True friendship

Power

Social power
Wealth
Authority
Preserving my public image
Social recognition
Conformity
Obedient
Self-discipline
Politeness
Honouring of parents and
elders

Universalism
Equality
Unity with nature
Wisdom
A world ofbeauty
Social justice
Broad-minded
Proteoting the environment
A world at peace
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Appendix C
Measures ofReligiosity.

How often do you pray?

How often do you go to Church?

0

daily

0

weekly

0

at least once a week

0

at least once a month

0

sometimes

0

sometimes

0

once or twice a year

0

once or twice a year

0

never

0

never

What religion are you? (Please tick one)
0

Catholic

0

Other Christian

0

Anglican

0

Non-Christian

0

Orthodox

0

I have no religion

Do you belong to a church youth group (eg, Antioch)
0

NO

0

YES

·..,','

·.-, .·...
, ; --·

~

please specify
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Below are a list ofstatements about religion and religious beliefs. On a scale ofI
to 5 where 1 is 'disagree strongly', 5 is 'agree strongly' and 3 is 'uncertain ',
indicate whether you agree or not with each statement.

Be honest. Indicate how troe each statement is for.J!JlJl..

2

I

disagree strongly

3

4

uncertain

I know Jesus helps me
I think going to church is a waste of time
God helps me to lead a better life
I like to learn about God very much
Prayer helps me a lot
I know that Jesus is very close to me
I think the bible is out of date
I find it hard to believe in God
I am a religious person

(see, Francis & Stubbs, 1987; Francis, 1989; Francis, et al, 1995)

:,·,:;-.
·. _., . -.- _·,·.-'
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5

agree strongly
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AppendixD
Participant Information Sheet

INVITATION TO BE INVOLVED IN A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY

Dear Year 12 Students:
As part of my honours year studies iti psychology at Edith Cowan University, I
am looking at what Year 12 students value in their lives.
I'd like some help!

What I'm after is a whole lot of Year 12 students who will agree to complete a
questionnaire on values. The results will be completely anonymous, so no-one
will see what you put. I'm !!!!! interested in the results of individual's - only in the
results from different groups.
The questionnaire should take no longer than about 30 minutes, and probably
even less. Afterwards I will be available to discuss the questionnaire with you if
you want. Please remember, I only want to compare groups! Your individual
names and results wont be seen by anyone except me. In the final report your
names will not be included.
Naturally, you don't have to participate, and if you do, you can change your mind
at any time (even halfway through). You may find it interesting- especially if
you plan to go on to study next year in a research based course (eg social sciences,
psychology, education), or if you are interested in psychological testing in general
(like they do for the Police and Defence forces). Hopefully, the data I collect will
go a long way to help make studying values (and religion) in school more relevant
and interesting.
If you have any questions, please ask me. Or, you can call the University and
speak to my supervisor, [Name] from the Psychology Department, on [Telephone
Number].

I can't do this without your help.

Many Thanks,
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Appendix E
Sample Consent form

I•

CONSENT FORM

I, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (STUDENT NAME)

-1'

have read the information provided describing the study,

-1'

have had any questions answered to my satisfaction, and
agree to participate in this study.

-1'

I understand that I am under no obligation to participate,

-1'

may omit individual questions, or withdraw altogether at any
time,

<~'

and realise that non-participation will not disadvantage me at
school.

I also understand that the data is collected for research only and
that, while the results may be published, neither my name nor the
school's name will be used.

Signature

Date

85

Appendix F
Scatterplots of correlations between religiosity and value types
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Figure Fl. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the
FSAC and the value type Achievement.
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Figure F2. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the
FSAC and the value type Benevolence.
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Figure F3. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the
FSAC and the value type Conformity.
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Figure F4. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the
FSAC and the value type Hedonism.
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Figure FS. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the
FSAC and the value type Power.
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Figure F6. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the
FSAC and the value type Security.
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Figure F7. Scatterplot ofthe relationship between religiosity as measured by the
FSAC and tbe value type Self Direction.
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Figure F8. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the
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FSAC and the value type Stimulation.
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Figure F9. Scatterplot ofthe relationship between religiosity as measured by the
FSAC and the value type Tradition .
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Figure FlO. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the
FSAC and the value type Universalism.
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